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Many distributive egalitarians do not endorse strict equality of goods. 
Rather, they treat an equal division as having a special status such that 
departures from equality must be justified. They claim, then, that an equal 
division is “presumptively” just. Though the idea that equality is 
presumptively just and that departures from it may be just has intuitive 
appeal, making a case for this idea proves difficult. I argue, first, that extant 
“presumption arguments” are unsound. Second, I distill two general 
philosophical morals: luck egalitarians have not adequately defended the 
presumption of equality and they face serious obstacles in doing so; Rawls 
has defended it, but only indirectly via the contract apparatus. This 
approach narrows the presumption’s appeal. Third, I consider and reject 
two alternative ways of understanding the presumption of equality that 
might avoid the problems revealed by my examination of extant views. The 
first appeals to the idea of value pluralism. The second treats the 
presumption as a view about the burden of proof. I conclude, ultimately, 
that it is misleading to think of distributive egalitarianism as typically 
having the form of a presumption argument.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many distributive egalitarians do not endorse strict equality of goods.1 
Rather, they treat an equal division as having a special status such that 
departures from equality must be justified. They claim, then, that an equal 
division is “presumptively” just. Rawls, for instance, argues that inequalities 
in wealth are just only if they make everyone better off than they would be 
at a “benchmark of equality”. Many luck egalitarians hold that distributive 
equality is the “moral default” and that departures from this default caused 
by brute luck2 are unjust while those produced by choice are just.
Though the idea that equality is presumptively just and that departures 
from it may be just has intuitive appeal, making a case for this idea proves 
difficult. In this paper I first show that extant “presumption arguments”, as 
I shall call them, are unsound. Some of the arguments I canvas are given in 
a critical vein, so not in all instances do I make an original case against the 
presumption. The point of this canvasing is to demonstrate the difficulties 
besetting presumption arguments. Second, I distill two general 
philosophical morals: luck egalitarians have not defended the presumption 
and they face serious obstacles in doing so; Rawls has, but only via the 
contract apparatus, which narrows the presumption’s appeal. Third, I 
consider and reject two alternative ways of understanding the presumption 
of equality that might avoid the problems revealed by my examination of 
extant views. The first appeals to the idea of value pluralism. The second 
treats the presumption as a view about the burden of proof. I conclude that 
it is misleading to think of distributive egalitarianism as typically having 
the form of a presumption argument.
2. GETTING TO AND DEPARTING FROM EQUALITY
Here are the bones of the presumption arguments I will consider:
1. Equality is presumptively just because it eliminates the influence of 
luck on distribution. Departures produced by choice are just 
because they hold people responsible for their choices.
2. Equality is presumptively just because it distributes the effects of 
luck equally. Departures produced by choice are just because they 
hold people responsible for their choices.
1  I use “goods” here as a neutral term for whatever distribuenda particular theories 
endorse.
2  Luck egalitarians distinguish between brute luck and option luck. See Dworkin 
(1981: 293). Throughout my discussion, I will use “luck” to mean “brute luck”.
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3. Equality is presumptively just because it is demanded by the equal 
worth of persons. Departures produced by choice are just because 
they hold people responsible for their choices, which is necessary 
for recognizing their capacity for agency.
4. Equality is presumptively just because it contains no inequalities 
caused by morally arbitrary factors. Departures from equality are 
just when and because they increase everyone’s wealth and 
maximize the wealth of the least wealthy.
5. Equality is presumptively just because it contains no inequalities 
justified by morally arbitrary factors. Departures from equality are 
just when and because they increase everyone’s wealth and 
maximize the wealth of the least wealthy.
6. Equality is presumptively just because it is demanded by the equal 
worth of persons. Departures from equality are just when and 
because they increase everyone’s wealth and maximize the wealth 
of the least wealthy.
Before outlining the arguments listed above, I must explain, in order to 
avert confusion, an idiosyncratic way in which “equality” is sometimes 
used by luck egalitarians. Ronald Dworkin (1981: 285-304), who is arguably 
the father of luck egalitarianism, maintains than an equal division of 
resources is not flatly equal but is, rather, one that meets the “envy test”. 
According to this test, a division is equal if no one prefers someone else’s 
bundle of resources – which includes both material goods and natural talents 
– to her own. This division, Dworkin states, ensures that each person pays 
the cost to others of her choices and is, to that extent, just.
One might think that changes over time to such an equal division are 
themselves just whenever people freely engage in production and exchange. 
However, Dworkin argues, this is not the case, for some will confront good 
luck and others bad, in particular with respect to their mental and physical 
powers – some will, luckily, have highly marketable talents and others less 
marketable talents. Because of the influence of luck, subsequent 
distributions will not be envy-free. Dworkin argues that those who suffer 
bad luck are owed compensation via a tax and transfer system, which is 
based upon a hypothetical insurance market, the details of which need not 
detain us. The point is that such a system is necessary to ensure that the 
distribution of resources in a market economy remains envy-free and, 
hence, equal and just.
Dworkin’s argument is not a presumption argument because equality 
of resources is not presumptively just on his view – it is just full stop. 
Distributive justice is preserved, he thinks, so long as production and 
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exchange continually produce distributions that meet the envy test. I 
assume that “equality” in the presumption arguments I discuss below 
refers to flat equality and not to Dworkinian equality because Dworkinian 
equality is not, by the lights of luck egalitarianism, merely presumptively 
just.
2.1. Eliminating the influence of luck
Susan Hurley (2003: 146-58; see also Eyal 2005) has proposed that luck 
egalitarians endorse the presumption of equality because they believe that 
an equal division eliminates the influence of luck on distribution, which is 
required by justice. They then endorse departures from this division that 
are produced by choice alone, as these inequalities hold people responsible 
for their choices, which is also required by justice. But, Hurley notes, this 
argument does not work because an equal division of goods might also be 
a matter of luck. She reasons as follows. If we redistribute equally all the 
goods that people have acquired as a matter of luck, then what share people 
have is still a matter of luck, at least insofar as people do not have the share 
for which they are responsible. It follows that an equal division does not 
extinguish the effects of luck, it merely rearranges them. So, an equal 
division cannot stand as the moral default on the ground that it neutralizes 
the effects of luck.
Suppose that the luck egalitarian can, contra Hurley, found the 
presumption of equality upon the demand to eliminate the influence of 
luck on distribution. In this case, the luck egalitarian would, nonetheless, 
not have a sound argument for the presumption of equality.3 This is because 
(re)distributing equally all the goods that people have gotten as a matter of 
luck would not create flat equality. The resulting distribution would instead 
contain inequalities produced by choice; people’s shares would be 
composed of whatever goods they acquired through their choices and an 
equal portion of the luck-tainted redistributed goods. It is hard to see how 
this division should serve, for the luck egalitarian, (merely) as a moral 
default. By luck egalitarian lights, this division does not require departing 
from since it contains inequalities that are just, namely those caused by 
choice, and (ex hypothesi) it extinguishes the effects of luck. 
There are two problems, then, with founding the presumption of 
equality on the idea that this will neutralize the influence of luck. The first 
is that equalizing the goods gotten by luck does not necessarily eliminate 
the influence of luck. The second is that even if it did, equalizing the goods 
3  Though they would have a sound argument for Dworkinian equality, in which 
case, they would not be making an argument for a presumptively just division, but for a just 
division.
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gotten by luck does not produce equality overall.
2.2. Equally distributing the effects of luck
Samuel Freeman (2007: 120-21, 151; see also Vallentyne 2003: 170, 177) has 
defended the luck egalitarian against Hurley’s charge by suggesting that 
the luck egalitarian is justified in demanding that the influence of luck be 
equalized. If we assume, he says, that everyone’s natural endowments are 
equally a matter of luck, then a principle of equity requiring us to treat like 
cases alike enjoins us to distribute the goods produced by our natural 
endowments equally rather than to let them fall into the hands of people 
according to their particular talents.4 The default justice of equality is 
founded, then, not upon the aim to neutralize luck, but rather on the 
demand to distribute the effects of luck equally.5
The problem with this amendment is that it does not address the second 
of the two problems identified above. Redistributing the effects of luck 
equally does not produce a flatly equal distribution. It produces one in 
which the goods initially acquired by luck are distributed equally and the 
goods attributable to people’s choices are distributed unequally. And so, 
according to luck egalitarianism, there is no obligation of justice to depart 
from this division.
2.3. Equal moral status and responsibility for one’s choices
Critics of Hurley claim that she proposes the luck neutralizing aim as a 
possible ground for the presumption of equality because she confuses the 
luck egalitarian demand to eliminate the effects of luck on inequality with 
a demand to eliminate the effects of luck on distribution (Vallentyne 2003, 
2006; Lippert-Rasmussen 2005; Cohen 2006; Segall 2012). For luck 
egalitarians, what should be neutralized is not the effects of luck but rather 
the differential effects of luck. It follows that if equality were caused by 
luck, it would not be unjust on that ground. In this sense, equality has a 
special status for luck egalitarians: it is immune from moral condemnation 
4  Presumably this argument would hold mutatis mutandis for other instances of luck 
that tend to affect people’s distributive shares, such as their class position at birth, their 
health, etc.
5  Cohen (2006: 445) holds a similar view, although he does not offer it as an argument 
for an egalitarian default. He says, “[s]uppose…that we could divide goods up into those for 
which people are responsible and those for which they are not responsible. Then…we might 
use only the goods for which people are not responsible as the currency of justice… If it is fair 
for people to keep, before any redistribution is set in train, what and only what they are 
responsible for, because they are responsible for it, then the same conception of fairness also 
requires that the rest be distributed equally, because to distribute otherwise is to benefit 
people in disaccord with their exercises of responsibility”.
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even if it is caused by luck. Hurley calls this approach “the equality default 
view”, suggesting that this immunity is unfounded.
Kok-Chor Tan (2012: 89-90) counters Hurley’s suggestion by providing a 
sketch of an argument for the presumption of equality and for departing 
from equality on grounds of choice. He reasons as follows: 6
1) Persons have equal moral worth as agents.
2) Therefore, distributive equality is the “moral default”: it is the 
distribution from which departures must be justified.
3) Departures from equality are justified when they are expressions of 
agency.
4) Therefore, departures produced by choice are justified.
5) “Distributive arrangements” that reflect luck and not choice fail to 
treat people as moral equals.
6) Therefore, distributions that reflect luck and not choice are 
unjustified.
As it stands, this argument is invalid: given that equality is a distribution 
that reflects luck (barring very unusual circumstances), it would, by the 
lights of this argument, be unjust and so it cannot be presumptively just. 
However, this version of the argument makes Hurley’s mistake. It treats 
distributions as such, rather than unequal distributions, as susceptible to 
the luck egalitarian criterion. This problem can be solved with the following 
changes:
1) Persons have equal moral worth as agents.
2) Therefore, distributive equality is the “moral default”: it is the 
distribution from which departures must be justified.
3) Departures from equality are justified when they are expressions of 
moral agency.
4) Therefore, departures produced by choice are justified.
5) Departures from equality that reflect luck and not choice fail to 
6  Tan (2012: 89-90) claims that he is not in fact arguing for the egalitarian default. He 
says, “[i]n explicating what I take to be the implicit starting point of luck egalitarianism, that 
of equal moral agency and how that ideal is interpreted to support equal distribution as a 
default independent of luck but subject to choice, I have not provided any argument for it. I 
take this ideal of equal moral agency and its egalitarian entailment to be a basic and starting 
intuition common to most accounts of luck egalitarianism”.
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treat people as moral equals7. 
6) Therefore, departures that reflect luck and not choice are unjustified.
This version of the argument is valid but not sound. The ultimate reason 
for this is that the same principle that grounds equality also grounds 
departing from equality to inequality caused by choice. So, the argument 
provides no grounds for departing (or not departing, for that matter) from 
equality. To see this, notice that the equal worth of persons does not entail 
distributive equality. In fact, the equal worth of persons is compatible with 
a number of distributions, including a winner-take-all lottery, the division 
that recognizes persons’ rights of self-ownership, and the division in which 
each gets what he deserves. Indeed, Tan’s argument implies that the equal 
worth of persons is also compatible with the ultimately just distribution to 
which he believes we should depart. This is because, given that luck and 
choice exhaust the possible cause-types of inequality, premise 5) entails 
that inequalities caused by choice treat people as moral equals. So, both 
equality and inequality caused by choice have the virtue of treating people 
as moral equals. However, if both distributions recognize persons’ equal 
moral worth, it is not clear, without further argument, why one is merely 
presumptively just while the other is completely or ultimately just.
Perhaps the further argument runs as follows: even though an equal 
division and an unequal division caused by choice both treat people as 
moral equals, the latter has the additional virtue of recognizing people’s 
moral agency. So, an unequal division caused by choice is, in the end, just. 
The problem with this suggestion is that if recognizing people’s agency is a 
distinct virtue from recognizing their moral equality, then it is not clear 
how departures from equality caused by luck fail to recognize people’s 
moral equality, as Tan proposes. Indeed, it turns out that they do this by 
ignoring people’s moral agency. Tan (2012: 89) states, “[f]or luck egalitarians, 
a distributive arrangement that reflects not agents’ free decisions and 
choices, but the circumstances that are forced on them, such as their good 
or bad luck, fails to treat them as moral equals”. The manner in which 
departures produced by choice succeed in treating people as moral equals, 
then, is by recognizing their moral agency and the manner in which 
departures produced by luck fail to treat people as moral equals is by 
ignoring their moral agency. So, in the end, that it treats people as moral 
equals is what justifies equality as the default and what justifies departures 
7 Insofar as lotteries treat people as moral equals, this claim is false. Lotteries are 
not, as such, matters of option luck. They are only so if one has a choice about whether to 
enter them. If the state were to distribute the fruits of cooperation, say, each year, by a 
winner-takes-all lottery, the outcome would be a matter of brute luck and it would treat 
people as moral equals insofar as everyone had the same odds of winning.
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from equality that are traceable to choice. Thus, the puzzle of why 
inequality based upon choice is preferable to equality remains.
(One might wonder, at this point, how it is that equality treats people as 
moral equals given that it fails to recognize people’s moral agency due to 
its lacking inequalities caused by choice. I believe the luck egalitarian 
answer must be this: the egalitarian moral default is immune from any 
condemnation that appeals to what causes it: it is not unjust even if caused 
by luck (as we saw above) and it is not unjust even if caused by a failure to 
incorporate choice.8)
To summarize, then, the problem with Tan’s approach is that because 
the same principle grounds both the default and departures from it, there 
is no reason to think of the default as merely presumptively just and 
departures based on choice as just full stop.9
2.4. Morally arbitrary factors and mutual benefit
Another presumption argument can be found in Brian Barry’s interpretation 
of an argument given by John Rawls that G.A. Cohen calls “the Pareto 
argument for inequality”. Cohen contends that this argument, which is not 
only reconstructed but also endorsed by Barry, is in fact internally 
inconsistent (Rawls 1971: 60-75; Barry 1989: 213-34; Cohen 2008: 87-97, 151-
168; see also Cohen 1995 and Shaw 1999).
Some background: Rawls offers the Pareto argument, which is distinct 
from his well-known social contract argument, to support the “difference 
principle”. The difference principle governs the distribution of income and 
wealth and says that only inequalities that benefit everyone and maximize 
the income of the worst off are just. The argument identifies an equal 
division as a presumptively just “benchmark” and states that we should 
depart from this benchmark only when inequalities fulfill the difference 
principle.
Rawls assumes, in this argument, that there may exist strong Pareto 
improvements on equality so that it will be possible to increase the income 
of everyone if inequality is permitted. He assumes this on the ground that 
the sum total of wealth may be greater when inequality is permitted 
because these inequalities provide incentives for people to work more, or 
at harder tasks, than they would under equality. Rawls’s aim in the Pareto 
argument is to single out the difference principle as the Pareto improvement 
on equality that qualifies as just. Though the reasoning is somewhat 
8  For discussion, see Segall (2016: 48-73).
9  A related issue is whether the two “conjuncts” of the luck egalitarian ideal can be 
grounded in the same principle. These are the claims that departures produced by choice 
are just and that departures caused by luck are unjust. See Sher (2014: 2-19).
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murky, it is clear that the idea that people’s natural talents are “arbitrary 
from a moral point of view” and hence should not “improperly influence” 
their incomes figures prominently.
According to the Barry/Cohen interpretation, Rawls founds the 
benchmark of equality upon the morally arbitrary status of natural talents 
and he founds the difference principle upon the irrationality of prohibiting 
mutually beneficial inequalities. Rawls’s reasoning for the benchmark, on 
this account, is as follows: inequalities in wealth that have morally arbitrary 
causes – including those caused by differences in natural talent – are 
unjust. Therefore, an equal distribution of wealth is prima facie just.10
Cohen identifies a problem with this inference: a division lacking 
inequalities with morally arbitrary causes will nonetheless contain 
inequalities with morally non-arbitrary causes (which, as Cohen sees it, 
are inequalities caused by choice). So, prohibiting inequalities caused by 
something morally arbitrary does not produce equality. So, it looks like the 
benchmark of equality cannot be grounded on the claim that inequalities 
with morally arbitrary causes are unjust.
 Cohen concludes from this problem with Barry’s reconstruction not 
that the reconstruction is wrong, but that Rawls must hold that differences 
in income caused by choice are not inequalities. So, the benchmark, Cohen 
says, is, for Rawls, not a flatly equal distribution. (As odd as this idea might 
seem to a Rawlsian, the notion that a division containing differences in 
shares produced by choice is an equal division has a precedent in luck 
egalitarianism, as we saw above. This may explain Cohen’s willingness to 
regard Rawls’s benchmark of equality as containing choice-produced 
differences in shares.)
  Rawls reasons further, according to this interpretation, that it would be 
irrational to settle for equality if there exist (strongly) Pareto superior 
unequal distributions – unequal distributions, that is, that benefit 
everyone. Of these distributions, the one that maximizes the income of the 
least well off – who have (again, as this interpretation goes) the strongest 
complaint against inequality – is just. Hence the difference principle is 
just.
Cohen maintains that Rawls’s case for the benchmark undermines his 
case for departing from it. If the benchmark is prima facie just on the 
ground that it contains no income inequalities with morally arbitrary 
causes, and if, as Rawls concedes, income differences that maximize the 
income of the least wealthy are caused by differences in natural talent, 
10  This is Cohen’s terminology. Rawls himself does not refer to the benchmark of 
equality as “prima facie just”.
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then the inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle are unjust. In 
other words, if equality is prima facie just on the ground that it is devoid of 
inequalities with morally arbitrary causes, then a Pareto improvement on 
equality that contains inequalities with morally arbitrary causes cannot 
be all things considered just.
Cohen’s observation about Rawls argument is, though, trivial given the 
way in which he sets the argument up. Because differences in shares of 
wealth with morally non-arbitrary causes are, by definition, not 
inequalities, then inequalities are, by definition, differences in shares with 
morally arbitrary causes. So, on Cohen’s account, Rawls’s argument for the 
benchmark amounts to the claim that equality is just because it contains 
no inequalities. Naturally, any departure from the benchmark would be 
unjust on this account. Only if the benchmark is flatly equal and all 
differences in shares, regardless of their cause, count as inequalities, does 
Cohen’s objection have force. For in this case, it would be a substantive 
claim to say that the difference principle is inconsistent with the 
justification for the benchmark on the ground that the difference principle 
allows inequalities that have morally arbitrary causes.
In summary, then, there are two problems with Rawls’s argument as 
Cohen interprets it (via Barry). The first is that eliminating inequalities 
with morally arbitrary causes does not in fact produce equality. The second 
is that if eliminating inequalities with morally arbitrary causes did 
(somehow) produce equality, the ideal justifying equality would be violated 
by departures to the difference principle.
There is a way of avoiding this second problem, Cohen says, but it ends 
up vitiating the case for the benchmark. Suppose we interpret Rawls as 
claiming not that morally arbitrary causes make inequalities unjust but 
that morally arbitrary causes cannot make inequalities just. If this is the 
case, then, departures from the benchmark to the difference principle are 
indeed just: though the inequalities allowed by the difference principle are 
caused by differences in natural talent, they are not justified by their being 
so caused. They are justified by the fact that they maximize the wealth of 
the least wealthy.
However, Cohen argues, this approach provides no ground for the 
benchmark of equality. If what makes a distribution prima facie just is that 
it contains no inequalities justified by their morally arbitrary causes, then 
equality is not the only distribution that can stand as a benchmark. Indeed, 
the principle of utility, Cohen says, can be the benchmark on this account, 
for it justifies inequalities on the ground that they are necessary to 
maximize the sum total of goods. So, on this second reconstruction of the 
Pareto argument, Cohen claims, departures from the benchmark of 
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equality to the difference principle are justified but the benchmark itself is 
not.
However, the problem is not merely that the ideal justifying equality 
does not single out equality as the benchmark, as Cohen observes, it is that 
the difference principle can also qualify as the benchmark since it shares 
the virtue of containing no inequalities justified by the morally arbitrary. 
As Cohen sets up this second version of the Pareto argument, it seems that 
there is no reason to prefer departures from equality to equality, as long as 
those departures contain no inequalities justified by their morally arbitrary 
causes, because it is sufficient for qualifying as just (albeit, prima facie just) 
that a distribution contains no such inequalities.
This would make the problem with the second Pareto argument similar 
to the problem with Tan’s account. On his view, recall, the same principle 
– the equal worth of persons – justifies both equality and departures from 
it and, therefore, there is no reason to see one distribution as presumptively 
just and the other as fully just. On this second Pareto argument, separate 
principles justify equality and inequality: equality is justified by the fact 
that it contains no inequalities justified by something morally arbitrary 
and inequality is justified by the ideal of mutual benefit. Hence it is not as 
clear as it is on Tan’s account that there is no reason to see an equal division 
as presumptively just and see the proposed departure from equality as 
ultimately just; perhaps the ideal justifying inequality can defeat the ideal 
justifying equality.
Yet the second Pareto argument is vulnerable to Tan’s problem, but for a 
different reason. The reason is that what makes equality just is the same 
thing that makes departing to the difference principle just: the absence of 
inequalities justified by their morally arbitrary causes. Indeed, that the 
difference principle shares the just-making property of equality is what 
keeps the second Pareto argument from making the mistake of the first 
Pareto argument. What we learned from that argument was that in order 
for a departure from equality to be just, the departure distribution cannot 
violate the principle that justifies the equal division. So, if equality is just 
because it contains no inequalities justified by the morally arbitrary, then 
the just unequal division must also contain no inequalities justified by the 
morally arbitrary. (If it contained such inequalities it would be unjust.)  It 
follows that, on the second Pareto argument, it is not obvious how we can 
distinguish, from the point of view of justice, between the benchmark of 
equality and the difference principle because they both contain a property 
that is sufficient for making them just. Hence the second Pareto argument, 
like Tan’s argument, appears not to be able to explain why equality is 
merely presumptively just while the proposed departure from equality is 
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ultimately just.
However, Cohen’s second Pareto argument may be salvageable on 
grounds not available to Tan precisely because separate principles are 
invoked to justify the benchmark and difference principle inequality. 
Perhaps the argument Cohen has in mind is this: equality is, let us say, 
sufficiently just because it contains no inequalities justified by differences 
in natural talent, and so no inequalities justified by something morally 
arbitrary. Difference principle inequality is more just than equality because 
it also contains no inequalities justified by something morally arbitrary 
and, on top of that, it is mutually beneficial relative to equality. (Another 
option would be to say that difference principle inequality is not more just 
than equality but is in some other way morally preferable. This 
interpretation is suggested by Barry’s claim that it would be irrational to 
insist on equality if mutually beneficial inequality that maximally benefits 
the worst off is available.)
On this interpretation, then, the second Pareto argument is stronger 
than Tan’s argument but it is not immune from Cohen’s original criticism 
of that argument, namely, that other divisions (besides equality) that lack 
inequalities justified by something morally arbitrary (though not the 
division to which we should depart) can qualify as the benchmark.
2.5 Equal moral standing and moral arbitrariness
A further problem with the first version of the Pareto argument outlined 
above is not noticed by Cohen. It is that if the benchmark of equality 
contains inequalities produced by choice, as Cohen claims it must, it is 
unclear why strong Pareto improvements on equality might be possible 
and it is unclear why departing from equality is required to avoid leveling 
down. After all, if people already have different shares of wealth at the 
benchmark that are produced by their choices about work, they do not 
need the promise of incentives inequality in order to work harder. The 
incentives inequality is already present at the benchmark. This observation 
suggests that the Barry/Cohen account of Rawls’s presumption argument 
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is incorrect.11  So, I offer below an alternative account of Rawls’s argument 
for the benchmark of equality. However, before outlining that account, 
which is different in its structure from the arguments I have thus far 
examined, let me identify three general desiderata for constructing 
presumption arguments that can be gleaned from the analysis above. It 
turns out that these cannot be simultaneously fulfilled, so presumption 
arguments must have a different structure than those discussed above.
1.  The thing that allegedly produces and justifies equality must 
actually produce equality. Otherwise genuine equality is not the 
default, and in some cases, it is not clear why the alleged default 
requires departing from.
2.  The thing that produces and justifies equality must entail equality. 
Otherwise, it is not clear why equality is the default, rather than 
some other distribution, including in some cases, the distribution 
departure to which is recommended.
3.  The unequal departure distribution must fulfill the principle that 
justifies equality. Otherwise, that distribution cannot be just.
The second two of these cannot be mutually satisfied. If what justifies 
equality entails it, then no departures can be justified. And if what justifies 
equality does not entail it, then departures can be justified, but equality is 
not uniquely justified as the default. As we will see below, this problem is 
traceable to the following feature of the above arguments: the presumptive 
justice of equality and the ultimate of justice of inequality are thought to 
hold in all circumstances. Rawls’s Pareto argument, though not sound as it 
stands, avoids this problem. It runs (as I interpret it) as follows:
1) Persons have equal moral worth.
2) Therefore, an equal division stands as a “benchmark for measuring 
improvements”. 
3) Suppose strong Pareto improvements on equality (e.g., unequal 
11  The idea that the moral arbitrariness claim is deployed by Rawls in the argument 
for the benchmark is not well supported by the text of the Pareto argument. But it may be 
supported by Rawls’s reason for rejecting the bargaining theorist’s use of the nonagreement 
point as the “status quo”: “[i]t is to avoid the appeal to force and cunning that the principles 
of right and justice are accepted. Thus, I assume that to each according to his threat 
advantage is not is not a conception of justice. It fails to establish an ordering in the required 
sense, an ordering based on certain relevant aspects of persons and their situation which are 
independent from their social position and their capacity to intimidate and coerce”. Rawls 
says, further, in a footnote to this passage, “[w]hat is lacking is a suitable definition of a 
status quo that is acceptable from a moral point of view. We cannot take various contingencies 
as known and individual preferences as given and expect to elucidate the concept of justice 
(or fairness) by theories of bargaining. The conception of the original position is designed to 
meet the problem of the appropriate status quo” (1971: 134).
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distributions that increase everyone’s share) are possible.
4) Then, of the two main candidates for the just strong Pareto 
improvement – laissez-faire  and the difference principle  – the one 
that minimizes the influence of morally arbitrary factors on people’s 
income shares is just.
5) The difference principle minimizes the influence of morally 
arbitrary factors on people’s income shares. 
6) So, the difference principle is just.
This is merely a skeleton of Rawls’s account, but the details are not 
important for assessing its form qua presumption argument. I wish to 
make two points about its structure. The first is that, as in Tan’s case, the 
second premise does not follow from the first without further argument. 
As I have already observed, many distributions can be grounded in the 
equal standing of persons. Indeed, if this were not case, there would be 
little disagreement among theorists of distributive justice.
The second point about the structure of Rawls’s argument concerns the 
status of the presumption. The sense in which equality is presumptively 
just is that it is just unless inequality can be mutually beneficial (Rawls 
1971: 62,76; see also Cohen 2008: 156-60). For Rawls (1971: 78), it is an open 
question as to whether or not this is the case. The answer depends upon 
the plausibility of certain economic theories and on controversial ideas 
about human motivation – for instance, the claim that people,  as a rule, 
will work less hard in the absence of incentives to acquire extra wealth.12 At 
the end of the day, for Rawls, whether or not equality or the difference 
principle is just depends on the circumstances.13
For this reason, an entailment relation between the justifier of equality 
and equality, which Rawls does not provide and which is necessary to 
single out equality as the benchmark, does not prevent departures: we can 
say that justice demands equality, and only equality, in some circumstances 
and it demands a departure from equality in others. Compare this approach 
to Tan’s. On his account, both equality and inequality generated by choice 
are just (in the way in which they are just) in any circumstance. The 
difference is in the way in which they are just – presumptively or ultimately. 
This gives us a clue as to how we might salvage Tan’s argument. It can 
be reinterpreted to have the same structure as Rawls’s.14  This interpretation 
12   For criticism, see Cohen (1997).
13  For discussion, see Cohen (2003).
14  Thanks to Christopher Wellman for pointing out that the luck egalitarian 
argument might have this structure.
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solves the main problem with Tan’s view, which is that because the same 
principle grounds both equality and choice-generated departures from it, 
there is no reason to treat equality as merely presumptively just and 
departures generated by choice as ultimately just. If circumstances change, 
however, then the same grounding principle might entail a different 
distribution. It might be that equal moral worth demands equality if 
choices do not produce inequality and otherwise demands inequalities 
produced by choice.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this interpretation is what luck 
egalitarians have in mind when they invoke the presumption, because it 
commits them to the idea that it is an open question as to whether or not 
choice will produce inequality. But there are strong reasons to think that 
inequalities produced by choice are simply inevitable. This is because 
differences in shares based upon choice depend, not on complex theoretical 
claims or controversial empirical claims, but on nothing more than the 
laws of physics: if you and I have the same capabilities and are gathering 
nuts in the same place, if I choose to gather for ten minutes and you choose 
to gather for twenty, you will (ceteris paribus) have more nuts than I. If 
inequality produced by choice is inevitable, then it is implausible to treat 
the presumption as endorsing equality on the condition that choice might 
not produce inequality.
To summarize, then, Rawls’s Pareto argument contains a plausible 
justification for departing from equality, to the extent that that departure 
precludes levelling down. (One may not agree with his account of which 
unequal distribution is just, but the idea that mutually beneficial inequality 
is, at least pro tanto, preferable to equality is reasonable.) However, Rawls’s 
account fails insofar as it does not single out equality as the just benchmark.
We can now draw two general conclusions about presumption arguments. 
First, luck egalitarians have not successfully defended the presumption of 
equality, because their distinction between presumptively and ultimately 
just describes two different ways in which distributions are just, rather 
than two different circumstances under which distributions are just. They 
are therefore vulnerable to the dilemma identified above: whatever 
justifies equality must entail it, or else equality is not uniquely justified, 
but if it does entail it, all departures are precluded.
Second, Rawls (1971: 118-83) is entitled to the presumption of equality, 
but the Pareto argument does not do the necessary work. In order to move 
from the claim of equal moral standing to the benchmark, Rawls needs the 
contract argument. In this argument, he models the equal standing of 
persons in his description of the parties to the contract and in his 
description of the hypothetical circumstances (the “original position”) in 
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which the parties deliberate about the distribution of wealth (among other 
“primary social goods”). The parties would opt for equality he argues, 
given their equal claim to social goods (derived from their equal status) 
and their lack of knowledge of their particular capabilities, unless they can 
all have more under inequality. In this case, Rawls argues, they would opt 
to maximize the wealth of the least wealthy, given their inability to predict 
their ultimate place in the distribution of wealth. While this approach 
arguably supplies a justification for equality as the benchmark (and, 
indeed, a justification for departing to the difference principle) it is 
controversial qua hypothetical consent argument.15
One last consideration: perhaps there are alternative ways of 
understanding the presumption of equality that I have not considered. 
Below, I briefly discuss two. I argue that neither is a strong candidate.
3. VALUE PLURALISM
The idea of value pluralism is frequently invoked by egalitarians, especially 
luck egalitarians.16  This doctrine says that equality is one among many 
values that bear upon the assessment of distributive arrangements.17  One 
proposal is that the presumption of equality is simply an expression of the 
notion of value pluralism. To say that an equal distribution is presumptively 
just is simply to say that, while there is something to be said for equality in 
assessing distributive arrangements, there is something to be said for other 
values as well and that these values permit or require deviations from 
equality. The presumption of equality, then, simply expresses the sensible 
view that equality is not the only thing that matters.
But notice that this way of putting the point presupposes the idea that 
15  For discussion, see Dworkin (1975); Stark (2000); Enoch (2017).
16  Larry Temkin (2003: 63), for example, says, “any reasonable egalitarian will be a 
pluralist. Equality is not the only thing that matters to an egalitarian. It may not even be the 
ideal that matters most. But it is one ideal among others that has independent moral 
significance”. See also, Temkin (2002); Parfit (2002); Segall (2007); Eyal (2007); Cohen (2008: 
4).
17  There are several notions of value pluralism proposed by egalitarians and several 
contexts in which value pluralism is said to apply. Some theorists, such as Temkin, Parfit and 
Cohen, hold that equality is one among many values bearing upon the goodness or the 
badness of a distribution. Others, such as Segall, hold that distributive justice (understood 
as the fulfillment of the luck egalitarian ideal of equality) is one among many values bearing 
upon the justice of the design of social institutions. Segall holds, further, that justice is one 
among many values bearing upon the morality of institutional design. Another view, 
advanced by Eyal, claims that luck egalitarian equality is one among many values bearing 
upon both the moral and non-moral goodness of a policy of compensating victims of bad 
luck. (See the references in the previous footnote.)
 The Presumption of Equality 23
LEAP 6 (2018)
equality has a special status. The proposal states that because equality is 
not the only thing that matters, we are sometimes justified in departing 
from it. But that assumes that equality has some sort of priority – it is the 
division that other values might justify deviating from. If equality really 
were simply one among many values pertinent to distributive ethics, then 
there are no grounds for positioning it as the distribution that other values 
might defeat. On a genuinely value pluralist view, we would take equally 
into account the ideals of, say, utility, mutual benefit and equality.18 That is 
to say, we would not assign a special weight or status to any of these values. 
A genuinely pluralist approach, then, represents an alternative to the idea 
that equality is presumptively just. Hence this approach cannot stand as 
an interpretation of the presumption.
4. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Another way to interpret the notion that distributive equality is 
presumptively just is as a claim about the burden of proof: the burden of 
proof, the argument goes, is upon those favoring an unequal division and 
not upon those favoring equality. Equality simply requires no justification.19 
As a preliminary point it is worth noting that as a matter of social practice, 
the burden of proof tends to be assigned simply to those who hold the more 
unusual view. For instance, vegetarians are often expected by meat-eaters 
to justify their refraining from eating animals, where meat-eaters generally 
do not see themselves as owing anyone a justification for their practice, in 
spite of the fact that their practice is arguably more harmful. Though most 
people may not believe in distributive equality, most political philosophers 
do.20 Yet this would surely be a flimsy ground for assigning the burden of 
proof to the non-egalitarian.
So, let us assume that claims about the burden of proof can stand on 
sturdier ground than the mere prevalence of a view. To assess the idea that 
distributive equality demands no justification let us compare that claim to 
some views about the burden of proof that are widely accepted. One such 
view is the legal presumption of innocence in some systems of criminal 
law. Another is the idea that the atheist is not required to disprove the 
existence of God in order to be justified in believing that God does not 
exist. The notion that the burden of proof falls upon those who support 
distributive inequality, I argue, is relevantly different from these two cases. 
18  See Parfit (2002: 87-88.)
19  Thanks to David Rondell for proposing this interpretation. See Gosepath (2011); 
Wollheim and Berlin (1955-56).
20  Many theorists of distributive justice are either Rawlsians or luck egalitarians.
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So, we have reason to doubt the claim that distributive equality demands 
no justification. I argue, further, that even if the presumption of equality 
were relevantly similar to the presumption of innocence, the idea that 
equality should be presumed just demands justification, for those who say 
that the accused should be presumed innocent can offer reasons for their 
view. Yet providing a justification for the idea that distributive equality 
requires no justification is tantamount to providing a justification for the 
idea that equality should be presumed to be just. And, depending on how 
that argument goes, it will be subject to the pitfalls I identified above in 
arguments for the presumption.
Here is how the presumptive innocence of the accused differs from the 
presumptive justice of distributive equality: where the former is a strictly 
epistemic notion, the latter is not. The demand to presume the accused 
innocent says that we must treat the accused as though they are innocent 
until there is sufficient evidence of their guilt. That is, until we know 
whether or not they are innocent, we treat them as though they are. We are 
not required to believe that they are innocent, or, alternatively, we do not 
ascribe to them the property of being innocent. To presume that an equal 
division is just, however, is not to treat equality as though it is just until we 
have sufficient evidence to think it unjust. Rather it is to say that equality is 
just, but that its justice can be defeated by other considerations. The 
presumption of innocence tells us what we should do when we do not know 
what to believe. The presumption of equality tells us what we should 
believe, namely that equality is just in a certain circumstance or that 
equality is initially just.
Even if I am mistaken about this difference, however, it seems reasonable 
for someone to demand reasons for assigning the burden of proof in a 
particular way. And, in fact, proponents of the idea that the burden of proof 
should be borne by the prosecutor to establish the guilt of the accused have 
offered reasons for their view. For example, one line of defense appeals to 
the serious harm of wrongful conviction. Placing the burden of proof on 
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused tends to produce more 
improper acquittals than improper convictions. The improper acquittals 
are seen as the legitimate price of avoiding wrongful convictions given the 
power imbalance between the accused individual and the state and the 
serious consequences of wrongful conviction.
Another view, proposed by Hamish Stewart (2014: 410), is that the 
accused have a right to be presumed innocent simply in virtue of being 
persons. The basic idea is that the moral status of persons includes being 
“without reproach”; it includes the right to not be “…found to have done 
wrong merely on the basis being a person”. Therefore, to judge someone 
 The Presumption of Equality 25
LEAP 6 (2018)
legally in the wrong that person must have done something legally wrong. 
So, persons have a legal right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
The continuity between this argument and both Tan’s and Rawls’s 
arguments for the presumption of equality is striking and lends credence 
to the notion that the presumption in favor of distributive equality must 
itself be justified; it is not adequate to simply assert that distributive 
equality needs no justification. 
The idea that the burden of proof falls upon the theist is similar in one 
respect to the idea that the burden of proof falls upon the non-egalitarian. 
Both are views about what one should take to be true. One should believe 
that God does not exist in the absence of evidence that he does exist and 
one should judge equality to be just in the absence of reasons that it is not 
just. However, the case involving God’s existence hinges on the fact that 
the theist formulates the thesis that God exists in way that ensures that it 
cannot be disproved and then claims that the fact that God’s existence 
cannot be disproved justifies belief in God. This is the point of Russell’s 
teapot analogy. Russell says that if he were to claim that a china teapot, too 
small to be detected by the most powerful telescopes, is orbiting the sun, it 
would be ludicrous to claim that the teapot non-believer must disprove the 
existence of the teapot in order to be justified in believing in its 
non-existence.21
The dis-analogy between this case and the presumption of equality is 
plain. The theist says that because we cannot prove the non-existence of a 
thing the non-existence of which is virtually impossible to prove we must 
believe in the existence of that thing. This is indeed a strong reason for 
thinking that the burden of proof does not rest upon the atheist. Yet no such 
sleight of hand is present in the case of the presumption of equality. We cannot 
say that the burden of justification falls upon advocates of distributive 
inequality because those individuals have formulated their account of 
distributive justice in such a way that there are no reasons that count against 
it and then claim that egalitarians must accept their view on the ground that 
they (egalitarians) can provide no reasons against it. So, just as the presumption 
of equality is not analogous to the presumption of innocence, it is likewise not 
analogous to the presumption of the non-existence of God.
21  To this, theists claim that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence – even if 
evidence cannot be provided for the existence of something it might still exist. And, 
moreover, theists say, the basis for their belief in God is not the absence of evidence for his 
non-existence but rather evidence for his existence. Just as there is evidence that there is not 
a China teapot orbiting the sun, there is evidence that there is a God, for the postulate that 
God exists can explain e.g., the origins of universe, the complexity of life on earth and so on. 
To this the atheist replies that the things that the postulate allegedly explains can be 
explained without the postulate.
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5. SUMMARY
The idea that distributive equality enjoys a special status such that 
departures from it require justification is indeed attractive. It allows us to 
endorse equality, in some sense, and, at the same time, avoid some major 
criticisms of equality, including the claim that it requires levelling down or 
fails to hold people responsible for their economic choices. Nevertheless, 
characterizing this special status and showing how it can be overridden or 
defeated proves difficult. I argued above that despite their endorsement of 
the presumptive justice of equality, luck egalitarians have not successfully 
shown equality to be presumptively just. This failure is due to the structure 
of their presumption arguments. In order to assign a special status to 
equality, then, luck egalitarians must fashion an argument that takes a 
different form.
Rawls, on the other hand, can assign a special status to equality. Its 
special status takes this form: it is the just division if, as a matter of fact, 
inequality does not increase the social pie in a way that benefits everyone. 
Otherwise it is unjust and the mutually beneficial division that maximizes 
the wealth of the least wealthy is just. To make this case, however, Rawls 
cannot rely upon the Pareto argument alone because that argument does 
not explain why equality stands as a benchmark. It explains only why 
departing from the benchmark to the difference principle is justified. 
Rawls must rely on the social contract argument to justify the special status 
of equality: equality is the benchmark because it is what people who know 
nothing of their natural talents and initial social position would choose 
(unless mutually beneficial inequalities are an empirical possibility). A 
weakness of Rawls’s approach is that it is limited in its appeal, given the 
controversial nature of social contract arguments.
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